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abstract
The main aim of my paper is to analyse 
Aristotle’s theory of language in the 
context of his Physics I.1 and via an 
analysis and an interpretation of 
this part of his Physics I try to show 
that (i) the study of human language 
(logos) significantly falls within the 
competence of Aristotle’s physics 
(i.e., natural philosophy), (ii) we can 
find the results of such (physical) 
inquiry in Aristotle’s zoological 
writings, stated in the forms of the 
first principles, causes and elements 
of the human speech (logos) and 
(iii) the analogies (Phys. 184b13-14) 
made by Aristotle at the very end of the 
first chapter make better sense if we 
consider them in the broader context in 
which Aristotle recognizes language as 
a complex natural phenomenon we are 
born into and which has to be not only 
biologically, but also socially developed 
through our lives. Hence, I aim 
towards a more naturalistic reading of 
Aristotle’s views on language.
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I. IntroductIon
The general objective of my paper is to 
contribute to the discussion of how we 
can reconstruct Aristotle’s theory of lan-
guage.1 I openly aim towards a more nat-
uralistic and more pragmatic reading of 
Aristotle’s views on language and I will 
try to justify my approach to this issue 
via a textual2 analysis and interpretation 
1 The issue of Aristotle’s theory of language 
and the topics related to this subject 
(Aristotle’s theory of meaning, Aristotle’s 
theory of signification), has been of sys-
tematic concern to such scholars as 
Kretzman 1974, Irwin 1982, Manetti 1993, 
Charles 1994 & 2000, Whitaker 1996, Bäck 
2000, Modrak 2001, De Rijk 2002, Walz 
2006, Castagnoli &  Di Lascio 2012 and 
Joseph 2017.
2 In this paper, I  follow C. D. C. Reeve’s 
translation of Aristotle’s Physics pub-
lished in 2018.
of the first chapter of the first book of 
Aristotle’s Physics.3
Before I start, I would like to make 
a short illustration of my approach to 
Aristotle’s theory of language. I reckon 
if Aristotle had been pushed to answer 
the following question “What kind of en-
tity is a phoneme?” he would answered 
it something like this: a phoneme is 
a physiological entity, it is a psycholog-
ical entity, it is an acoustic entity and it 
is also an abstract entity. So, all these 
3 Those interested in historical commen-
taries on the first book of Aristotle’s 
Physics would be satisfied by a detailed 
overview they can find in McMahon 
1957. There have been several mod-
ern English translations of important 
historical commentaries to the first of 
book of Aristotle’s Physics published re-
cently, see e.g., Themistius 2012 or John 
Philoponus 2006.
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answers are correct. But at the same 
time, he would add that no individual 
answer or combination of answers is 
absolutely correct by itself.
Why do I think so? Because in his 
writings Aristotle clearly and rigorously 
distinguishes several ways of method-
ological examination of the same phe-
nomenon. He is aware of the fact that we 
can examine every phenomenon from 
various perspectives and that different 
goals lead us towards different answers. 
With respect to this, we should not forget 
also the frequency with which Aristotle 
uses the πoλλαχῶς λέγεται phrase in 
his writings. The phrase clearly indi-
cates that Aristotle always distinguishes 
different perspective from which one 
analyses subject matter.
In any case, in his zoological writ-
ings (HA, PA, GA) Aristotle examines 
human language as a natural phenom-
enon related to its bearers (i.e., to liv-
ing beings of the human natural kind).4 
For this very reason, I decided to take 
a closer look at the opening chapter of 
Aristotle’s first book of his Physics where 
he sets up the basics for scientific inquiry 
concerning nature and its objects.5
The specific aim of my paper is to 
analyse Aristotle’s theory of language 
in the context of his Physics I.1 and via 
4 More naturalistic approach to the study 
of Aristotle’s views on human language 
can be found in Zirin 1974, Zirin 1980, 
Laspia 2018.
5 For precise analysis of a method pro-
posed by Aristotle in his first book of 
Physics see Bolton 1991. For complex 
interpretation of a method used in the 
whole area of scientific inquiry about 
nature and its objects see e.g., Lennox 
2010.
analysis and interpretation of this part 
of his Physics I try to show that (i) the 
study of human language (logos) sig-
nificantly falls within the competence 
of Aristotle’s physics (i.e., natural phi-
losophy), (ii) we can find the results of 
such (physical) inquiry in Aristotle’s 
zoological writings, stated in the forms 
of principles, causes and elements of 
human speech (logos) and (iii) the anal-
ogies (184b13-14) that Aristotle presents 
at the very end of the first chapter make 
better sense if we consider them in the 
broader context in which Aristotle rec-
ognizes language as a complex phenom-
enon we are born into and which has to 
be not only biologically, but also socially 
developed.
II. What does It take 
to do scIence? What does It 
take to Possess a scIentIfIc 
understandIng?
Let’s start with the first paragraph. 
“Since in all methodical inquiries in 
which there is knowledge—that is, sci-
entific knowledge—of things that have 
starting-points, causes, or elements, it 
comes from knowledge of these (for we 
think that we know each thing when 
we know its primary causes and pri-
mary starting-points, all the way to its 
elements), it is clear that in the scien-
tific knowledge of nature our first task 
must be to try to determine the start-
ing-points.” (Phys. 184a10-a16).
The first paragraph indicates that 
we know something insofar as we 
know its primary causes and primary 
starting-points, all the way to its ele-
ments. To see the proper message of 
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this paragraph one needs to know the 
broader context of Aristotle’s thinking 
about methodological inquiry which 
could provide us with understanding 
of some phenomena. In the Posterior 
Analytics Aristotle claims that to know 
something is not only to know hoti 
(that something is the case), but also to 
know dioti (why something is the case).6 
It is also well known that for Aristotle 
epistémé (scientific knowledge or under-
standing) is a state of the soul that ena-
bles its possessor to give demonstrative 
explanations in the form of apodeixis 
(demonstration) which is a special sort 
of syllogismos (deduction) which starts 
from scientific starting-points (archai).7 
What are those starting points?
III. What Is necessary 
for scIentIfIc exPlanatIon? 
startIng-PoInts, causes and 
elements
According to APo I.10, 76a37-b22, spe-
cifically scientific starting-points are 
of just three types. But those special to 
demonstrative science are definitions of 
the real essences of the beings studied 
by particular science.8 Real definitions 
analyse the real essence of the natural 
objects into its “elements and start-
ing-points” (Phys. I.1, 184a23). The real 
essences of those objects are definable, 
though indemonstrable within the (nat-
ural) science. The real definition makes 
intrinsically clear what the nominal 
6 See APo II.1, 89b23-35.
7 For an extended analysis of archai (first 
principles) and its role in human knowl-
edge see Irwin 1988. 
8 Reeve 2018, p. 179.
definition made clear only by enabling 
us to recognize instances of named phe-
nomenon in a fairly, but imperfectly, 
reliable way.  People who know hoti 
but do not know dioti are not able to 
offer a real definition, which must state 
the cause.9 E.g., “Thunder is a noise in 
the cloud” is only a nominal definition 
which declares the usage of the word 
“thunder” as the correct wording for 
noise in the cloud. But to offer a real 
definition of thunder to  someone who 
wants to understand the phenomenon 
of thundering, it is necessary to include 
the cause in the definition. We are ready 
to explain thundering when knowing 
the efficient cause of that natural phe-
nomenon. Why does it thunder? Due to 
the extinguishing of fire in the clouds. 
Therefore, thunder is a noise in a cloud 
caused by an extinction of fire.10 But 
before we are ready to offer an explana-
tion of something via stating the start-
ing-points, causes and elements we have 
to know how they are obtained.
Iv. What kInd of 
knoWledge Is needed before one 
can start doIng scIence?
What is the natural route to knowing 
something? Let’s consider the second 
paragraph: “And the natural route is 
from things that are knowable and 
more perspicuous to us to things that 
are more perspicuous and more know-
able by nature, since the same things 
are not knowable to us as are knowable 
unconditionally. That is why we must 
9 See also Met. I.1, 981a28–30.
10 See APo II.10, 94a1-10.
INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018
70
in this way advance from things that 
are less perspicuous by nature but more 
perspicuous to us to the things that are 
more perspicuous by nature and more 
knowable.” (Phys. 184a17-a21).
The second paragraph indicates that 
we do not build our scientific knowl-
edge and our ability to demonstrate it 
out of nothing. Based on APo I and II, it 
is clear that Aristotle presupposes that 
we possess some kind of pre-existing 
knowledge of a non-demonstrative na-
ture. So, Aristotle tells us that it is very 
natural that when we start to make 
a methodological inquiry, we already 
do possess some kind of non-demon-
strative and pre-existing knowledge. We 
‘know’ things that are more perspicuous 
to us in a weaker sense, and we advance 
to things that are more perspicuous by 
nature. But what is the nature of objects 
that are more perspicuous to us? An an-
swer to this question can be found in the 
next sentence of Aristotle’s text.
v. hoW to Proceed from 
that WhIch Is confused to that 
WhIch Is dIfferentIated?
Let’s continue with the first half of the 
last paragraph: “The things that are in 
the first instance clear and perspicu-
ous to us are rather confused. It is only 
later, through a division of these, that 
we come to know their elements and 
starting-points. That is, why we must 
proceed from the universals to the par-
ticulars. For it is the whole that is more 
knowable by perception, and the uni-
versal is a sort of whole. For the uni-
versal embraces many things as parts.” 
(Phys. 184a22-b10).
To return to the previous question, 
(what is the nature of objects that are 
more perspicuous to us), we can now 
see that those objects are universals and 
they are rather confused. This means 
that such objects cannot satisfy our 
requirement to lay down the basic prin-
ciples of science. Therefore, I suggest 
following Reeves11 in distinguishing 
(i) confusing and raw starting-points 
or principles which we possess naturally 
via our perceptual habits and also via 
our ordinary linguistic practise from 
(ii) explanatory relevant starting-points 
which we derived from the previous 
ones through the process of division 
(diairesis).12
The role and importance that 
Aristotle ascribes to the process of di-
vision (diairesis) and its results can be 
found in APo II.13 and II.14. By diaire-
sis we conceptually pick up those items 
(relevant attributes, causes or elements) 
which we need as the parts of the broader 
items – definitions and demonstrations. 
To divide means to pick up something 
from previously posited item or previ-
ously presupposed whole.
vI. hoW to Proceed 
from the unIversals to the 
PartIculars?
In the process of division, we divide 
something broader (which has been pre-
viously somehow grasped or postulated 
by the operation of abstraction) into 
more (at least into two) narrower parts. 
11 See Reeve 2018, pp. xiv-xlv.
12 A  complex assessment of the  role pre-
scribed to the procedure of division by 
Aristotle can be found in  Falcon 1997.
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However, we recognize those parts as 
parts of the whole only conceptually. 
So, our natural route is to start with 
something which is broader, more uni-
versal and acquired (collected) through 
our sense-perception (and therefore not 
clearly distinguished) and to proceed 
downwards until we reach particulars.
There is a huge discussion about the 
meaning of the phrase καθ’ ἕκαστα in 
this chapter of Aristotle’s Physics.13 How-
ever, to allow space for my main point, 
I just confess that I follow the interpreta-
tion that understands particulars as the 
lowest level kind of species (ideally, the 
infimae species). The reason why I do that 
is that only such interpreted ultimate 
particulars fulfil the requirement to be 
results of the diairesis procedure and 
only such comprehended particulars can 
take part in definitions which we need 
to establish the demonstrative science 
in the form of apoideixis. To clarify his 
message, Aristotle attaches three ana-
logical examples which should help us to 
comprehend what he has in mind.
vII. analogy to the 
route of grasPIng the fIrst 
PrIncIPles, statIng the causes 
and reachIng the elements
Let’s start with the last part of Aristotle’s 
text. “The same thing happens in a way 
with names in relation to their account. 
For a name like “circle” signifies a sort of 
whole in an undivided way, whereas the 
definition divides it into its particular 
[elements]. And children at first suppose 
all men to be their fathers and all women 
13 See e.g., Ross 1936 (pp. 456-458) and 
Owens 1981.
their mothers, only later coming to divide 
up each of them.” (Phys. 184a22-b10). 
Aristotle wants to be understood well, 
hence he attached analogies. He tries to 
indicate that the route from the universal 
and rather confused to the particular and 
precise (differentiated) is somehow sim-
ilar to (a) the name – account relation. 
But this is a very general analogy which 
is illustrated in its turn by two specific 
examples – by (b) the definition of a cir-
cle and by (c) the language acquisition 
analogy.
I think it could be helpful to ask what 
these examples have in common. Beyond 
a doubt, all of them are about names, 
more precisely about the noun-kind of 
names (“circle”, “fathers” “men” etc.). 
All of them are about named objects, i.e., 
sense-perceptible entities (like a par-
ticular circle I drew on a sheet of paper 
or concrete individuals like my father 
or the man over there). All of them in-
clude a procedure of division (dividing 
some pre-existing and confused objects 
into their parts) and finally, all of these 
examples are about a process of transfor-
mation of something which is indeter-
minate into something which is definite 
and somehow basic or fundamental.
Let’s look at Aristotle’s Rhetoric. 
Here we can find the definition of circle. 
A circle is “a plane figure that extends 
equally from the centre”.14 I think what 
Aristotle wants us to realize is the fol-
lowing. A name like “circle” or “father” 
signifies a sort of whole in an undivided 
way, whereas via a process of division 
we arrive at definitions which divide 
14  Rhet. III.6, 1407b26-27.
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something formerly undifferentiated 
into its particulars. Hence definition 
reveals the differentia specifica and this 
makes the essential features of the object 
we want to scientifically understand pre-
cisely comprehensible.
Now we can turn our heads towards 
the language acquisition analogy once 
again. “And children at first suppose all 
men to be their fathers and all women 
their mothers, only later coming to di-
vide up each of them.” (Phys. 184b12-14). 
It seems to me that this analogy makes 
better sense if it is read in the context 
of APo. II.14, where Aristotle warns sci-
entists not to confine themselves to tra-
ditional class-names (koina onomata). 
Such a behaviour could be harmful to 
science. If scientists limit themselves to 
attributes expressible only by common 
terms, they miss a chance to identify ex-
planatory, relevant distinctive features 
of the natural objects they want to study 
and understand.15 I think that ordinary 
words (koina onomata) signify the mud-
dle of elements and principles given us 
through our experience (sense-percep-
tion, memory) and through the pro-
cess of epagógé. Hence, I think that for 
Aristotle, the first task of the scientific 
approach is to analyse perceived phe-
nomena and ordinary concepts. If we 
do so, we will be able to distinguish the 
parts of these sensory and linguistic 
muddles and we will arrive at the par-
ticular things underlying them. Only 
then we can securely set up the demon-
strative science. Therefore, I suggest re-
jecting the notion that Aristotle is some 
15 Cf. APo II.14, 98a13-19.
kind of naïve epistemological realist 
who advocates a direct correspondence 
between our thinking and the world. 
Neither is he some kind of innatist who 
presupposes that we somehow directly 
grasp the right forms of the natural ob-
jects we observe. I think that the last 
analogy vividly indicates that Aristotle 
sees the acquisition of language as a so-
cial process in which we stabilize our 
“wordings”. We first learn to hear and 
to pronounce “wordings” in the right 
situations (referring to the objects suc-
cessfully) and only through this process, 
with the help of new “wordings”, do we 
develop our ability to analyse (to differ-
entiate) our formerly muddled concepts 
arrived at as the results of our direct 
observations, memories or experiences.
vIII. conclusIon
What can we gain from Aristotle’s 
Phys. I.1 for a reconstruction of his the-
ory of language? To scientifically under-
stand nature and its objects, we need to 
grasp objects of a different character, 
not the objects of our ordinary experi-
ence. We are looking for objects which 
could help us explain why some natural 
phenomena occur regularly because, for 
Aristotle, science is all about explaining 
what happens always or at least for the 
most part. We can ask e.g., Why is it so 
that human beings manifest themselves 
via language? To answer this question, 
we need to start with the identification 
of those objects which can help us to 
understand language, namely princi-
ples, elements and causes. Before we 
start our scientific inquiry, we have to 
realize that the objects of our everyday 
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experience, collected via our memory 
and described by our ordinary language 
offer us only confused concepts (such 
as writing, speech, sound, sentences, 
meaning and so on). Without further 
analysis (diairesis) of our confused con-
cepts about language we are not ready 
to obtain precise and theoretically-sen-
sitive concepts that could help us to un-
derstand and explain human language.
To legitimize my interpretation, 
I should be ready to show whether there 
is such a procedure in Aristotle’s corpus. 
Whether Aristotle was looking for the 
principles, i.e., real definitions of nat-
ural objects and their attributes when 
studying human language. Did he ana-
lyse natural phenomena, and did he iden-
tify the basic building blocks (elements = 
material causes) of which our speech is 
made, our language consists of? And 
finally, did Aristotle explain a state of 
affairs via specifying some features or 
some objects which are responsible for 
it? My answer is yes. Aristotle did exactly 
so. He identified theoretically-sensitive 
objects (air, soul, reason/nous, differen-
tiation, phonemes, syllables, logical con-
junctions etc.) which help us to under-
stand and explain natural phenomenon 
of human language.
In Aristotle’s History of animals and 
De anima we can find a note on the mate-
rial cause of human language. Aristotle 
identifies the material cause of human 
language with air. He claims human 
speech is made of air, which we pro-
duce in our lungs, exhale by our midriff 
and modulate via our ‘vocal cords’. But 
instead of vocal cords, Aristotle enlisted 
the whole complex of bodily organs such 
as lungs, windpipe, trachea, larynx, 
pharynx, tongue, lips etc.16
In his De Anima Aristotle enounces 
the efficient (or moving) cause of human 
language. The efficient cause of our lan-
guage is our soul. Human language is 
caused by a human soul possessing the 
faculty of reason (at least in the stage of 
dynamis, which could be developed and 
manifested later on).
If we look at Aristotle’s political writ-
ings, namely at his Politics, we can find 
another perspective on the final cause 
of human language. Aristotle proclaims 
that “the function of language is to indi-
cate the advantageous and the harmful, 
and so also the just and unjust, for it 
is peculiar to man in comparison with 
other animals that he alone has the per-
ception of good and bad, just and unjust 
and other such things.”17 One can ask 
whether assignment of such a purpose 
is not an idealistic one and whether it 
is accessible to all of us. My opinion on 
this is as follows, even though the telos 
of human language is achieved in the so-
ciety spontaneously, it is not achieved by 
all of us. One needs to use the language 
for noble purposes.
Working on the basis of the forego-
ing I conclude that the phenomenon of 
language could be understood only when 
analysed from a variety of perspectives, 
via categories of principles, cause and 
elements. In Aristotle’s writings, our 
human language is part of our human 
organism, so its study certainly falls 
16 See DA II.8, 420b5-421a6 and HA IV.9, 
535a29-535b2.
17 Pol. 1253a13-17 (Here I use the translation 
by Zirin 1980).
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within the competence of natural phi-
losophy, i.e., physics.
But at the same time our language 
also exceeds our bodies, makes itself 
semi-independent (or let’s say it has an 
objective existence in the world) and 
therefore it is accessible to others. For 
that very reason, we are able to study the 
language per se, language as a system. It 
is this perspective that Aristotle applies 
when studying the parts of our language 
(in his Poetics), the effects of our speech 
acts (in his Rhetoric) and the rules of our 
linguistically expressed reasoning in 
his writings on logic (Cat., De Int., APr, 
APo, Top., SE).
Therefore, reconstruction of Aris-
totle’s theory of language could be suc-
cessful only when we apply a more inte-
grationist approach. Only then it will be 
possible to explain how Aristotle’s views 
of language (laden by different perspec-
tives and different goals of study) are 
connected to each other.
aPPendIx: 
a termInologIcal remark
When talking about human beings I use 
the terms ‘language’ and ‘speech’ inter-
changeably. The reason for that is as fol-
lows. From Aristotle’s zoological writ-
ings we can reliably extract the idea of 
logical subsumption among concepts of 
noise, voice, speech and language.18 Hu-
man language (logos) is kind of speech 
18 Cf. HA IV.9, 535a27-b3.
(dialektos), every speech is kind of voice 
(phóné) and every consciously produced 
voice is kind of noise (psofos), but not 
vice versa. Aristotle ascribes voice only 
to those living beings which produce 
noise via their respiratory system. This 
is a physiological requirement. But the 
voice must be caused by the souls of 
animals and it must be accompanied 
by phantasmata. This is a psychological 
requirement.19 Next, he distinguishes 
the speech-kind of voice and he names 
it dialektos. Dialektos is an articulated 
voice. So, there is a physiological require- 
ment of articulation, which in fact is 
the ability of an animal to join the dis-
crete units of voice into more complex 
units according to some rules. And as 
far as these rules are concerned, there 
is also a social requirement for the way 
in which speech is transmitted from 
one individual to another in the liv-
ing community. Finally, on top of that, 
Aristotle recognized even logos which is 
a species-specific kind of speech attrib-
uted only to human beings and only to 
those who possess capacity of nous. But 
it must be clarified that to achieve a fully 
developed manifestation of human lan-
guage one has to develop it socially. 
Last of all, we must not forget that for 
Aristotle every linguistic assertion and 
human language as a whole is meaning-
ful only by convention (κατὰ συνθήκην), 
not as an instrument.20
19 Cf. DA II.8, 420b26-32.
20 Cf. De Int. 17a1-2.
abbrevIatIons
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Aristotelés
Cat. Categories
De Int. De Interpretatione
APr Prior Analytics
APo Posterior Analytics
Top. Topics
SE Sophistical Refutations
DA De Anima
HA History of Animals
PA Parts of Animals
GA Generation of Animals
Rhet. Rhetoric
Pol. Politics
Phys. Physics
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